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Abstract: Nowadays, there is a growing environmental concern about were 
the energy that we use comes from, bringing the attention on renewable 
energies. However, the use and trade of renewable energies in the market 
seem to be complicated because of the lack of guarantees of generation, 
mainly in the wind farms. The lack of guarantees is usually addressed  by 
using a reserve generation. The aggregation of DG plants gives place to a new 
concept: the Virtual Power Producer (VPP). VPPs can reinforce the 
importance of wind generation technologies, making them valuable in 
electricity markets. This paper presents some results obtained with a 
simulation tool (ViProd) developed to support VPPs in the analysis of their 
operation and management methods and of their strategies effects. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Electricity generation affects the environment, causes climate change, and associated with 
it are the concerns and questions about the threats to our way of life. The investment on 
sustainable environmental policies caused the emergence of a new generation 
technologies, based on renewable resources. An efficient management with scalable and 
intelligent planning in a distributed generation environment will help  performing this 
task. 
Low emission generation technologies, such as the wind generation technology 
(IEA, 2002) allow a new repositioning of a significant part of the generation. Those could 
be distributed and owned by decentralized players, providing a significant amount of the 
electricity generation presenting economic and technical benefits to the network 
(Khattam, 2004). 
Furthermore, it is encouraged by a regulatory framework favourable to co- 
generation and renewable energy as well as by the attractive cost of some equipment and 
the low cost and flexibility of some primary energy. At this stage the main technologies 
used are micro and hydro turbines, fuel cells, wind generation, and solar cells (IEA, 
2002). 
Setting up the generation in a Distributed Generation (DG) model, helps to archive a 
cleaner and more efficient electricity use. The energy generation near the consumers 
reduces the waste of energy spent on the incoming energy transmission from the 
generation plants. In order to archive an even better management, the generation can be 
associated with attractive high efficiency equipments and combines several technologies 
such as wind and co-generation. 
A deregulated market, where low power rating generators sell their power in the 
market, could present economic and technical benefits (Khattam, 2004). However, there 
are serious barriers to the successful participation of these generators in the market, both 
of economic and technical nature.
  
 
 
 
Currently, DG technology is supported through government policies and subsides, 
but in the future this type of generation, could be autonomous and act in the competitive 
market. 
In the technical field, we focus on the reserve, because some of the technologies 
used in DG have problems in resource forecasting, in particular wind and photovoltaic 
energy are those that need more attention in this respect. In this context the reserve 
management can be a critical issue to VPPs activities, because, if they have energy 
surplus or shortage, they can be harshly penalized, depending in the market organization 
and, mainly, on the penalties. 
 
 
2 Virtual Power Producers (VPP) 
 
The aggregation of DG plants gives place to a new concept: the Virtual Power Producer 
(VPP). VPPs are multi-technology and multi-site heterogeneous entities. In the scope of a 
VPP, producers can make sure their generators are optimally operated and that the power 
that is not consumed in their installation has good chances to be sold in the market. At the 
same time, VPPs will be able to commit to a more robust generation profile, raising the 
value of non-dispatchable generation technologies. 
Under this context, VPPs can ensure security, environmental friendly generation 
and optimal management of thermal energy and electricity, as well as optimal operation 
and maintenance of electrical equipment, including the sale of electricity to the market. 
In a deregulated market, generation is scheduled through an open wholesale market 
where large amounts of electrical energy are traded daily. Marketplaces are today 
organized over one or several countries, and each marketplace has its own set of rules. 
One of the functions of the VPP is to determine the amount of energy to negotiate in 
the market. This is a complex task namely due to the uncertainty of the generation 
forecasts. 
If a producer is associated to a VPP, the energy delivered by a wind farm can be 
more optimized. VPPs sell larger quantities of energy and therefore from a producers 
view, the associated forecasts risks are minimized. The losses caused by penalization in 
sequence of an overestimated forecast of a specific producer may be compensated by 
other producer’s energy surplus. 
In the other hand, VPP has at his disposal an amount of strategies that can avoid 
penalties for the producers. 
VPPs must identify the characteristics of each one of their associates and try to 
optimize the selling activity so that each associate delivers the biggest possible amount of 
energy. The ideal situation would be to sell all the energy that its associates are able to 
produce at each instant, however this is not possible due to the uncertainty of generation 
of the technologies that depend from natural resources as the wind, sun, waves or water 
flows. 
The method used by the markets to penalize the violation of the established 
contracts is not uniform, which implies different forms of the VPPs action. 
In markets where penalty mechanisms exist, such as the French, the Italian, the 
Finnish, the Swedish or the British (Table I), the VPPs have to conveniently manage the 
generation capacity of the associated producers to assure enough reserves, to compensate 
generation oscillations. 
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Table 1  Balancing system 
 
Country 
Type of balancing 
system 
 
Existence of 
penalty 
regime 
 
 
Type of penalty regime 
 
Denmark The ‘Nordic’ system No Not relevant 
Every participant needs 
to have an ‘open 
Finland 
supplier’. Fingrid assures 
the balance of the whole 
country.
1
 
Yes — 
France Balancing market Yes — 
Extra price for capacity 
Germany — No 
 
Italy Balancing market Yes 
A merit-order list 
component when tolerance 
band is exceeded 
Operator imposes penalties 
(warning, suspension, 
exclusion) 
Norway 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
regulates production up 
or down if there is 
imbalance. 
Services managed by the 
system operator, which 
allocates imbalances to 
generation companies 
through a competition 
mechanism 
No Not relevant 
 
 
 
 
No Not relevant 
 
 
 
Higher prices than spot price 
Sweden 
Balancing market, run by 
Svenska Kraftnät 
for imbalance in the wrong 
direction 
UK (GB) Balancing market
2 
Yes 
UK (NI) 
Tariff for top-up and for 
spill 
 
Imbalance prices calculated 
from Balancing Mechanism 
bias 
Tariff is the same as for 
franchise customers 
 
 
Notes: Where no data were provided, this is indicated by a dash (—). 
1 - Fingrid maintains power reserves in case of system disturbances. Security of 
supply has been allocated to National Emergency Supply, an agency which is 
obliged to acquire the necessary supplies or contracts. 
2 - NGC Transmission System Security and Quality of Supply Standard - Issue 2. 
Sources: Elkraft System AMBA (Denmark), Fingrid System Oy (Finland), DVG 
(Germany), GRTN (Italy), Statnett  SF  (Norway),  REE  (Spain), Svenska 
Kraftnät (Sweden), NGC (GB), NIE (NI) (Oxera, 2001). 
Yes 
  
i 
 
 
The energy reserves will have to be assured, in the first place, by producers using 
technologies that allow them to control the net injected power, such as co-generation, fuel 
cells, or gas turbines. These producers may establish contracts with the VPP, for 
supplying the imbalance settlement energy, below of theirs nominal capacity. 
Another possibility for the VPP to assure some level of reserve is, to have specific 
plants for that. These plants can be managed by the VPP or by another entity. 
However it will have higher costs, essentially in the initial investment. Start-up 
costs must be considered, to decide what units should be in spinning reserve. 
It’s also possible to establish contracts with large power plants. These contracts may 
be bilateral for large periods of time, for example 6 or 12 months, with a fixed power 
contract, or daily in the spot market, in function of the necessities forecast. If the energy 
is bought in the market, the purchase price will be equal to the selling price, resulting in 
profits due to the inexistence of penalties. 
If the energy is acquired by bilateral contracts, it will have a fixed value every day 
and it can be used for reserve or as a part of the production after checking that it is not 
necessary to use all power for reserve. 
The VPP can also adopt a hybrid solution, combing more than one  option of 
reserve, in order to minimize the costs and to diversify options. 
The reserve value that the VPP has to guarantee depends basically in the Market, 
and on the generation technologies that it can use. 
If the VPPs have plenty producers without dispatchable technologies, that are 
physically distant with similar characteristics, it could exist a reserve factor that permits 
the reduction of the spinning reserve. This factor is given by the forecasts probability of a 
specific plant, which is producing below the estimative value and according to another 
that is producing over or according to the estimative value considered by forecasts. 
The reserve factor is obtained regarding the experiences and considering the biggest 
period of time. 
One determinant factor will be the wind farm installed capacity. It’s not possible to 
use the reserve factor in the global generation when the capacities are different. In those 
situations the reserve factor has to be applied only to plants with less installed power. 
This factor can be different in each VPP, according to the experience and the 
operation time of its aggregates. 
A possible strategy is to have as reserve the amount of power that guarantees n-1 
security. In this case, if the biggest generation unit gets out of service and if all the other 
producers are operating in accordance with the foreseen, the VPP will be able to continue 
to guarantee all the established contracts. 
Let us consider a VPP with n associated producers. If this VPP contracts a fixed 
power value with a thermal producer on an annual basis to use for reserve proposes, we 
have: 
 
n therm i j 
P Pmax   R 
j 1 
1
Where : 
Ptherm   Contracted  Thermal Power 
P
max No min al Power of  the biggest Generation Unit 
j Producer  Associated  to VPP 
Rj  Contracted  Re serve  with  Associated  Producer j 
  
i 
f 
f 
 
 
. 
 
The VPP can keep this constant reserve value, resulting in a higher security when 
the sold energy decreases. 
Because of that, the VPP can reformulate its strategy, in function of the sold energy, 
changing the scheduled generation. 
The VPP can negotiate the excess reserve with other market agents or the system 
operator. 
When the forecasted generation for the bigger generation unit is lower than its 
nominal power the required reserve is also lower. In this case, the VPP can sell the 
exceeding energy in the spot market. 
In this situation, we have: 
 
n P  P f   P R 2

VPP 
i1 
 
i therm VPP 
R  P f  
max 3
VPP i 
 
 
Where : 
PVPP Power that VPP can negociate in the market 
RVPP   VPP Reserve 
P 
f   Forecasted  power   for  generation unit i 
 
Generation and reserve values can change dynamically. In some situations, the n-1 
security level cannot be assured. 
The bigger penetration of wind energy (and other technologies with similar 
characteristics) causes lesser generation stability with oscillations around the values 
foreseen for the reserve and generation. Assuring the required security level, brings 
higher costs to the VPP but it’s useful to avoid penalties by the market operator such as: 
payments, warning, suspension or exclusion. 
Another solution is to guarantee as reserve a percentage of the foreseen generation 
in each moment. In this situation the power available to negotiation and the reserve are 
calculated by: 
 
n 
Pi              Ptherm  
P
VPP 
 i 1 
1Perc 
5
n 
Pi             Ptherm   Perc 
R
VPP 
 i 1    
 1  Perc 
6

Where : 
Perc Percentage of intended reserve 
  
 
 
 
There are some markets where contract violations do not imply direct penalties. In 
those markets the system operator handles the system reserve which is paid in fixed taxes 
by each seller agent. This methodology does not prevent the inadequate behaviour of 
seller agents on the market what can impose a tax raise. On the other hand, this situation 
can promote speculations with the sellers negotiating deliberately energy, without any 
type of supply guarantee. 
 
 
3 SIMULATION TOOL 
 
A simulation tool, named ViProd, has been developed to simulate the operation of a VPP 
and his interaction with the market. This tool takes into account the characteristics of the 
technologies used by the power producers and can be used to provide decision support to 
VPPs. 
ViProd is divided in two different parts: one calculates the generation to the next 
day and other simulates the generation. 
Using this tool, producers can be associated to a VPP and each one of them can 
produce energy with different technologies and in distinct places. Figure 1 shows a 
producer with four different technologies. 
 
Figure 1 – Simulation of a producer 
 
 
 
To estimate the generated power by different producers using technologies such us 
wind power, small hydroelectric and photovoltaic, real information concerning wind, 
water flows, temperature and radiation has been used. Figure 2 shows the wind 
simulation. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Wind Simulation 
 
 
 
We can define the local and the amplitude of the resource variation related to these 
phenomenon. A random variation allows the tool to be more realistic, making the 
forecasting errors dependent from the time to the forecasted situation. This characteristic 
helps to produce scenarios closer to the reality. 
All the considered generation technologies were simulated. Figure 3 shows an 
aspect of the display concerning a wind farm simulation, considering the curves of power 
in function of the resources given by the manufacturers. 
 
Figure 3 – Wind farm Simulation 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Initially, each producer has to indicate to the VPP, the foreseen generation to the 
next day, the energy prices, the power reserve and reserve prices. Based on this data, the 
VPP must compose the bids to the market, according to the already referred criteria. 
In case of the technologies that are dispatchable, the producers and the VPP make 
an agreement to consider some of the available power as reserve to assure the VPP 
reserve. The reserve value is calculated according to the penetration of non-dispatchable 
technologies. 
The second part of the simulation tool simulates the management of all VPP 
generation. At the beginning, it makes a dispatch in function of the sold energy, 
producer’s price and their capacity of generation. Later, it controls the generation of the 
producers and generates the reserves of each one, as excess or lack of generation exists. 
The result is that we can check the generation by technology and the reserve that 
exist at each moment in the system. 
 
4 Case studies 
 
With the developed simulation tool, several studies were done, using different levels of 
reserve. The goal was to test if the amount of reserve power was enough to allow the VPP 
supplying the sold energy, preventing penalty costs. 
In this section we present two case studies. In both, the same simulation is 
considered for two different days, one of September and another of November, in two 
different markets (UK and France). All prices are in Euros, considering 1£ = 1.45€. 
In the first case study, we consider several types of producers and the evolution 
throughout the day, of there generation using different technologies. The simulated 
Scenarios (Sc) are the following: 
 
 Scenario 1 - Reserve assured by a thermal plant with contracted power 
equal to the nominal power of the biggest unit (P = 52 MW); 
 Scenario 2 - Reserve assured by a thermal plant with contracted power 
equal to the nominal power of the biggest unit (P = 52 MW). The actual 
reserve value is adjusted to the maximum value of the foreseen power in 
each instant, being available remain VPP to commercialize; 
 Scenario 3 - Reserve assured by a thermal plant with contracted power of 
20 MW; 
 Scenario 4 - Reserve assured by a thermal plant with contracted power of 
10 MW; 
 Scenario 5 - Reserve assured by a thermal plant with contracted power of 
10 MW and by the producers (co-generation, fuel cells, and gas turbines 
contribute, each one, with 10% of its generation for reserve power); 
 Scenario 6 – Reserve assured by the producers, (co-generation, fuel cells, 
and gas turbines contribute, each one, with 10% of its generation  for 
reserve power); 
 Scenario 7 - Without reserve. 
 
This case considers ten producers, as presented in table 2: 
  
 
 
 
Table 2  Producers – Case1 
 
Producers Technology P (kW) PT (kW) 
 Wind farm 25 300  
1 Wind farm 7 200 33 750 
 Wind farm 1 250  
 Small Hydro 5 500  
2 Small Hydro 3 500 12 500 
 Small Hydro 4 500  
 Wind farm 52 000  
 
3 
Fuel Cell 4 000  
64 800 
 Fuel Cell 3 000  
 Gas Turbine 5 800  
 
4 
Wind farm 9 000  
19 000 
 Small Hydro 10 000  
 Wind farm 6 500  
 
5 
Photovoltaic 250  
7 200 
 Fuel Cell 200  
 Gas Turbine 250  
 
6 
Co-generation 525  
585 
 Co-generation 60  
 Small Hydro 8 000  
 
7 
Fuel Cell 500  
10 100 
 Fuel Cell 1 000  
 Fuel Cell 600  
8 Co-generation 3 880 3 880 
9 Co-generation 5 500 5 500 
10 Thermal α α 
Notes: P – Generation Unit nominal Power;  PT – Producer nominal Power; 
  
 
 
 
Having in consideration that this software generates random values, we made ten 
simulations for each Scenario, with the intention of getting average values. 
Producer 10 simulates a thermal plant that it’s main function is to assure some level 
of reserve. 
The “α” value chosen for the reserve calculation depends on the used method. 
The reserve of each producer is defined by a contract with the VPP. 
 
 
Table 3  Energy Balancing – Case1 
 
Scenario ES (MWh) ED (MWh) EU (MWh) EE (MWh) 
1 1 823.9 1 823.9 0 0 
2 2 545.3 2 545.3 0 0 
3 1 823.9 1 822.1 1.8 0 
4 1 823.9 1 801.6 22.3 0 
5 1 702.4 1 696.6 5.8 0 
6 1 702.4 1 662.5 39.9 0 
7 1 823.9 1 729.0 94.9 0 
Notes:    ES - Sold Energy; ED - Delivered Energy; 
EU - Undelivered Energy;  EE - Exciding Energy; 
 
 
Table 4  Market Results – UK 28/09/2005 – Case 1 
 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 77 893.44 143 943.13 0 - 66 049.70 
2 108 399.02 158 501.82 0 - 50 102.80 
3 77 803.83 113 104.57 92.85 - 35 393.60 
4 76 816.07 102 353.51 1 177.73 - 26 715.17 
5 72 430.21 100 916.77 317.94 - 28 804.51 
6 70 867.00 89 505.85 2 010.97 - 20 649.82 
7 73 668.65 89 112.13 4 460.64 - 19 904.12 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5 Market Results – UK 28/11/2005 – Case 1 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 203 619.21 143 943.13 0 59 676.07 
2 285 249.14 158 501.82 0 126 747.32 
3 203 437.77 113 104.57 293.23 90 039.98 
4 200 944.61 102 353.51 3 445.10 95 146.00 
5 189 248.49 100 916.77 1 000.26 87 331.46 
6 185 185.20 89 505.85 5 951.58 89 727.78 
7 192 982.50 89 112.13 13 837.17 90 033.20 
 
Table 6 Market Results – France 28/09/2005 – Case 1 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 88 340.50 143 943.13 0 -55 602.63 
2 123 959.95 158 501.82 0 -34 541.87 
3 88 232.07 113 104.57 147.52 -25 020.02 
4 87 117.69 102 353.51 1 568.75 -16 804.58 
5 82 072.59 100 916.77 437.08 -19 281.26 
6 80 321.94 89 505.85 2 675.85 -11 859.76 
7 83 534.20 89 112.13 6 269.24 -11 847.17 
 
Table 7 Market Results – France 28/11/2005 – Case 1 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 277 819.86 143 943.13 0 133 876.72 
2 391 749.85 158 501.82 0 233 248.03 
3 277 607.98 113 104.57 220.50 164 282.92 
4 273 829.62 102 353.51 4 252.67 167 223.44 
5 257 895.20 100 916.77 1 202.09 155 776.25 
6 252 193.55 89 505.85 7 207.17 155 480.52 
7 262 820.13 89 112.13 15 746.93 157 961.07 
 
The values in tables 4 to 7 are based on the values presented by the entities 
responsible for the market management and/or for the balancing mechanisms that, in the 
case of UK and France, are, respectively, UKPX/Elexon and PowerNext/RTE (Ukt, Elx, 
Pnt, Rte, 2006). 
  
 
 
 
The cost evaluation associated with the operation of the producers has been done 
with software available in the Retscreen web site (Retscreen, 2006), where, in accordance 
with specifications previously defined, it is possible to determine the costs of generation 
for the different technologies. 
The VPP costs are calculated using the values proposed by the producers, the cost of 
the reserve, and costs associated with VPP management and operation services. 
Analyzing the values presented in Tables 4 to 7, it can be concluded that in the space 
of two months, between September and November of 2005, the expectations of the VPP 
are totally different. 
In both markets, we got results from about ten thousands Euros of losses in 
September to hundreds thousands Euros of profits in November. These variations reflect 
the instability of the oil markets, on this period of time. 
It is important to point out that the undertaken calculations did not take into account 
any type of subsides or benefits, that usually are attributed to DG. 
It is interesting to verify that, although both markets present similar behaviours, the 
French market has considerably higher profits for all the scenarios than the English 
market, relative to November. 
Considering the month of September and comparing the several scenarios we can 
verify that lesser the reserve, lesser the financial losses. 
In November the situation is totally different. The scenario that presents greater 
profit is Scenario 2, with higher sold energy and no penalties. 
In this example, a contract for 6 months with a thermal plant was simulated with a 
price of 52 €/MWh. 
As prices increased significantly, if all the contracted energy to the thermal plant 
was sold by the VPP probably there would be even better results. 
Analyzing Scenarios 5, 6 and 7, it can be verified that the differences between the 
values of the profits are relatively small (± 3%). However, the penalties values are 
substantially different, what means that using the strategies considered in Scenario 5 the 
VPP will be able to reduce significantly the penalties and improve its credibility without 
affecting substantially the profits. 
Even in Scenario 6, using only reserve power from its associates, the VPP reduces 
significantly it’s penalties. 
In the second case study, the simulation considers a three wind power producers 
association. Each one of these producers has a co-generation unit with a nominal power 
of about 10% of the wind farm capacity. 
 
Table 8  Producers – Case1 
 
Producers Technology P (kW) PT (kW) 
 
1 
Wind farm 30 000  
33 030 
 Co-generation 3 030  
 
2 
Wind farm 20 000  
21 000 
 Co-generation 2 100  
 
3 
Wind farm 13 000  
14 250 
 Co-generation 1 250  
Notes: P – Generation Unit nominal Power;  PT – Producer nominal Power; 
  
 
 
 
 
The co-generation will serve as support of the wind farms, to compensate the 
generation variations of this type of producing units. 
In this case study, hall the required reserve is assured by VPP own means. 
In this case the simulated scenarios are the following: 
 Scenario 1 - Reserve assured by the producers, with all the co-generation 
production as reserve; 
 Scenario 2 - Reserve assured by the producers, with 75% of the co- 
generation production as reserve; 
 Scenario 3 - Reserve assured by the producers, with 50% of the co- 
generation production as reserve; 
 Scenario 4 - Reserve assured by the producers, with 25% of the co- 
generation production as reserve; 
 Scenario 5 - Without reserve. 
 
 
Table 9  Energy Balancing – Case2 
 
Scenario ES (MWh) ED (MWh) EU (MWh) EE (MWh) 
1 529.41 570.29 3.17 44.06 
2 567.69 574.47 0.92 7.70 
3 605.97 614.64 14.05 22.72 
4 644.25 633.77 11.85 1.38 
5 682.53 659.80 32.00 9.27 
Notes:    ES - Sold Energy; ED - Delivered Energy; 
EU - Undelivered Energy;  EE - Exciding Energy; 
 
 
Table 10 Market Results – UK 28/09/2005 – Case 2 
 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 22 779.48 29 940.42 -1 540.54 -5 620.40 
2 24 408.45 30 159.54 - 257.59 -5 493.50 
3 25 915.56 32 268.65 - 210.94 - 6 142.14 
4 27 163.82 33 273.09 533.57 - 6 642.84 
5 28 287.05 34 639.25 1 143.66 - 7 495.86 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 11 Market Results – UK 28/11/2005 – Case 2 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 59 484.73 29 940.42 - 4 282.01 33 826.32 
2 63 786.14 30 159.54 - 685.81 34 312.41 
3 67 806.14 32 268.65 - 434.36 35 971.86 
4 71 190.49 33 273.09 1 574.26 36 343.15 
5 74 244.19 34 639.25 3 840.40 35 764.54 
 
 
Table 12 Market Results – France 28/09/2005 – Case 2 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 25 704.33 29 940.42 - 1 953.05 - 2 283.04 
2 27 572.31 30 159.54 - 306.98 - 2 280.25 
3 29 312.92 32 268.65 - 225.05 - 2 730.68 
4 30 743.58 33 273.09 712.38 - 3 241.88 
5 32 041.51 34 639.25 1 625.54 - 4 223.28 
 
 
Table 13 Market Results – France 28/11/2005 – Case 2 
Scenario Sells (€) Costs (€) Penalty (€) Profit (€) 
1 81 360.90 29 940.42 - 2 549.36 53 969.84 
2 87 283.41 30 159.54 - 409.29 57 533.15 
3 92 810.66 32 268.65 905.60 59 636.41 
4 97 357.83 33 273.09 2 006.83 62 077.91 
5 101 522.60 34 639.25 5 084.86 61 798.49 
 
Such as in the previous case, the results of the considered September day have been 
negative. 
For the considered November day, the results have been positive, and the scenario 
that presents greater profit is scenario 4. In this scenario the reserve is only 2.5% of the 
wind generation, however it is enough to reduce the penalties by half and to develop some 
profits. 
Comparing scenarios 3 and 5, we can see that, in France, scenario 5 is more 
advantageous; however, in UK, it is the inverse. On the other hand, in scenario 3, in 
France, the penalties are positive and in England the penalties are negative. While in the 
first one we have energy surplus, in the second we have energy shortage, modifying the 
penalty regime. 
  
 
 
 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper we presented some VPP reserve management strategies. The main goal is to 
decide the best VPP management strategy for generation and reserve. The VPP must 
know all the market rules and the balancing mechanisms, in order to adjust its own 
strategy to improve its performance in the electricity market. 
With a correct reserve management, according to the used technologies, the VPP 
has higher probability to deliver all the energy that it already sold, minimizing the 
penalties. 
There are markets where the incomplete fulfilment of all rules established in the 
contracts, do not impose any type of penalties. However, the VPP, such as the others 
agents in the market, will have to fulfil all the agreements, to guarantee a good 
functioning. 
The paper uses a simulation tool (ViProd), developed, by the authors, in 
Maltab/Simulink, to simulate the operation of a Virtual Power Producer (VPP). This tool 
allows creating several producers using several generation technologies and simulates the 
internal generation scheduling as well the interaction between the VPP and the electricity 
market. 
This paper includes two case studies to demonstrate the results of all considered 
reserve management strategies in two different electricity markets, France and UK, in 
two days of different months, September and November. The results have been obtained 
by Viprod, considering each market characteristics and real prices. With Viprod a VPP 
can analyse is own data and decide the most adjusted reserve management strategy to 
each situation. 
Presently, we are working on the integration of ViProd with an electricity market 
simulator – MASCEM (Praça, 2003) that has been developed in GECAD as a multi-agent 
system. This integration will allow analyzing the results of several VPP strategies when 
acting in the market. 
As future work we will model our simulation tools beyond the simple concept of a 
seller-buyer model, introducing the VPP, bringing new features, like the representation of 
the intermediate energy trades. 
The new developed tools, allow a more complete understanding of the market, 
showing the efficiency of a VPP operating in a competitive market, versus a single 
isolated producer market. 
Redesigning the system to archive a new set of features embedded on the intelligent 
agents interaction, built upon a redesigned environment will introduce those new 
possibilities in the system. 
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